Do risks matter? Variable and person-centered approaches to adolescents' problem behavior  by Modecki, Kathryn Lynn
Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology 42 (2016) 8–20
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Applied Developmental PsychologyDo risks matter? Variable and person-centered approaches to
adolescents' problem behaviorKathryn Lynn Modecki
School of Psychology and Exercise Science, Murdoch University, Australia
School of Applied Psychology, Grifﬁth University, AustraliaE-mail address: k.modecki@Grifﬁth.edu.au.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.appdev.2015.11.001
0193-3973/© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc.a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 28 November 2014
Received in revised form 17 October 2015
Accepted 6 November 2015
Available online 24 November 2015Two limitations in research examining adolescents' risk cognitions have been the absence of developmental age
group comparisons on a breadth of cognitions and the need to better characterize how cognitions inﬂuence be-
havior. To address these limitations, this study compared adolescent (n = 205; 52% female) and young adult
(n = 274; 58% female) risk cognitions (risk probability, risk identiﬁcation, risk tolerance, risk salience, and risk
preference) and used variable- and person-centered approaches to explore how cognitions affect problem be-
havior. Adolescents generally reported lower risk-related cognitions than young adults. Further, risk probability,
the cognition typically assessed in research, did not exert an independent effect on behavior. Adolescents and
young adults were characterized by two similar cognition proﬁles, but only adolescents were characterized by
a third, maladaptive proﬁle, Low Identiﬁcation/High Preference, reﬂecting low risk identiﬁcation and risk salience
and high risk preference. Interventions should arguably target these three cognitions within at-risk youth.







InterventionAdolescence is widely recognized as a critical period for preventing
problem behavior. High school-aged adolescents (grades 9–12) engage
in high rates of behaviors that contribute to unintentional injuries, mor-
tality, and social problems such as substance use, aggression, and delin-
quency (Centers for Disease Control & Prevention [CDCP], 2014). For
instance, more than 20% of high school students report binge drinking
in the last month and nearly 25% report involvement in a physical
ﬁght in the last year (CDCP, 2014). These behaviors, if established dur-
ing adolescence, often extend into young adulthood, when they can es-
calate (Neinstein, Lu, Perez, & Tysinger, 2013). In the last 20 years,
researchers have made exciting discoveries that can inform interven-
tions by explaining why adolescents choose to engage in activities
that threaten their health and long-term interests (e.g. Durston &
Casey, 2006; Somerville, 2013; Steinberg, 2008). Much of this research
has focused on adolescents' biologically-based reward-system, which
impels them to pursue the social and emotional rewards of risky and an-
tisocial choices. However, perceived rewards are only one piece of the
decision making puzzle (Ernst et al., 2005; Fischhoff, 2008). Adoles-
cents' cognitive control system, the decelerating-counterpart to their
reward-drive, also contributes to their behavioral choices (Van
Duijvenvoorde, Jansen, Bredman, & Huizenga, 2012).
In fact, dual systemmodels of decisionmaking point to a critical role
for cognitive control in adolescents' problem behavior involvement. For
instance, one prominent biological theory contends that adolescents'This is an open access article under tcognitive control system is underdeveloped relative to their reward-
drive (Spear, 2013; Steinberg, 2008). This developmental-lagmodel im-
plicates a maturation-mismatch between a mature excitatory system
and an incipient cognitive system, suggesting that adolescents cannot
exert behavioral control in risky and antisocial contexts (Casey, Jones,
& Somerville, 2011; Somerville, Jones, & Casey, 2010). Researchﬁndings,
however, are not unequivocally supportive of “developmental mis-
match” theories (e.g. Romer, 2010). As a result, some scholars argue
that the control system is no less mature than the affective system. In-
stead, connections among control systems are simply less networked
or ﬁne-tuned, so that this mechanism for regulating dangerous and
problematic behavior does not function as rapidly or as regularly as
the reward system (Crone & Dahl, 2012; Luciana, 2013). However,
both of these viewpoints imply that reduced cognitive control capacities
contribute to adolescents' afﬁnity for problem behavior and that deter-
mining the effect of control cognitions on behavior requires a nuanced
approach.
The current study focuses on risk cognitions as a marker of how the
control system curbs adolescents' problematic choices, ranging from
shoplifting to violent behavior. More speciﬁcally, I address two issues
that could better explicate the role of risk cognitions in these types of
behaviors. First, many studies have asserted that adolescents and adults
are essentially equivalent in judging risks (e.g. Knoll, Magis-Weinberg,
Speekenbrink, & Blakemore, 2015, comparing youth ages 12–14 and
15–18, with young adults 19–25 and adults 26–59; Cohn, Macfarlane,
Yanez, & Imai, 1995, comparing adolescents ages 13–18 with their par-
ents ages 28–62). However, previous studies have measured riskhe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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lescents' reported likelihood of possible risk, is fundamental to choice
(Slovic, 1998; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, &MacGregor, 2004). Yet a review
of cognitive, public health, and criminological literatures identiﬁes sev-
eral other inﬂuential risk cognitions that research has not yet adequate-
ly examined. As a result, we do not yet know whether adolescents are
less capable than older age groups when anticipating aspects of risk
other than risk probability. Second, previous research generally shows
only weak linkage between adolescents' risk cognitions and their prob-
lematic choices (e.g. Baumgartner, Valkenburg, & Peter, 2010; Ben-Zur
& Reshef-Kﬁr, 2003; Goldberg, Halpern-Felsher, & Millstein, 2002).
However, researchers have based these conclusions on variable-
centered methods such as regression, which have focused on whether
one or two risk cognitions predict problem behavior. Scholars have
not yet focused on alternative methodologies to characterize how cog-
nitions might inﬂuence decisions. Namely, contemporary decision
models suggest that choices to engage in problem behavior may draw
on a general, intuitive impression of risk (Quartz, 2009). Methods that
treat the adolescent, rather than the variable, as the unit of analysis
may best capture these intuitive risk impressions. For instance,
person-centered techniques such as latent proﬁle analysis (LPA) can
help to assess whether distinct groups of adolescents can be identiﬁed
through their naturalistic groupings of risk cognitions, and can assess
whether these cognition proﬁles differentiate adolescents who engage
in especially high or low levels of problem behavior (Pears, Kim, &
Fisher, 2008). As a result, LPA can complement the information regres-
sion affords, and together, person- and variable-centered methods can
provide more comprehensive understanding of how risk cognitions in-
ﬂuence adolescents' choices.
The current study addresses these two issues, which research has
under-explored to date. First I comparemean-level differences between
adolescents and young adults on ﬁve theoretically relevant risk cogni-
tions (risk probability, risk identiﬁcation, risk tolerance, risk salience,
and risk preference). Importantly, use of a young adult sample as a com-
parison represents a conservative test of adolescents' developmental
deﬁcits in perceiving risk, because the pre-frontal system, which is re-
sponsible for cognitive control, continues to ﬁne-tune throughout
young adulthood (Luciana, 2013). Thus, although young adults are
should be less risk-averse than adults (Modecki, 2009). Second, I ex-
plore the inﬂuence of risk cognitions on behavior using two comple-
mentary approaches, variable-centered (regression) and person-
centered (LPA) methods (Bates, 2000). A traditional variable-centered
approach assesses direct relations between risk cognitions and problem
behavior and whether the magnitude of these relations differs for ado-
lescents versus young adults. In corresponding analyses, I take a
person-centered approach to identify meaningful cognition patterns
among these different age groups and test whether individuals with
certain cognition patterns are more or less problem behavior involved.
As a result, this study informs understanding of developmental age-
group differences in risk cognitions and also how these cognitions im-
pact youthful choices.
Which risk cognitions matter?
Facedwith antisocial opportunities in the realworld, adolescents es-
timate the probability or likelihood of possible risks (risk probability).
Before gauging probability, however, they must also identify possible
risks (risk identiﬁcation). Further, young people likely also draw on in-
formation about their own tolerance for negative consequences (risk
tolerance) and intuitively assess how much they care about negative
outcomes should they occur (risk salience). Finally, adolescents arguably
gauge the relative importance of possible risks in relation to possible
beneﬁts of problem behavior (risk preference). As a result, all of these
cognitions likely inform adolescent impressions of risk. However, ques-
tions as towhether cognitions, outside of risk probability, reﬂect adoles-
cents' under-estimation of risk relative to young adults remainunderexplored. Further, additional research is needed to determine
the degree to which risk cognitions play a role in adolescents' problem
behavior, especially once other relevant factors such as perceived bene-
ﬁts and decision experience are taken into account (Goldberg et al.,
2002; Halpern-Felsher et al., 2001). Of these ﬁve risk cognitions, the
most studied involves risk probability.
First, studies that compare adolescents' risk probability or likelihood
with older age groups providemixed evidence of developmental differ-
ences. Some studies have found that adolescents (13–18) underesti-
mate the potential risk associated with occasional involvement in
problem behaviors relative to their parents (Cohn et al., 1995);whereas
others studies have found no evidence that adolescents underestimate
risk likelihood relative to parents (Quadrel, Fischhoff, & Davis, 1993)
or relative to young adults (20–30 year olds) (Millstein & Halpern-
Felsher, 2002). One potential explanation for these inconsistencies is
that developmental age group differences in decision making may be
less attributable to adolescents' capacity to agreewith already identiﬁed
risks, and more attributable to adolescents' diminished capacity to
generate potential risks on their own accord (Beyth-Marom, Austin,
Fischhoff, Palmgren, & Jacobs-Quadrel, 1993; Millstein &
Halpern-Felsher, 2002). Thus, age group differences may not exist for
risk probability, but they may exist for risk identiﬁcation, as described
below. Evidence also suggests that the effect of adolescents' probability
judgments on behavior may be neither independent nor linear. Al-
though research often associates probability judgments with problem
behaviors, the strength of this association is typically onlyweak tomod-
erate, especially when the model includes perceived beneﬁts
(Maslowsky, Buvinger, Keating, Steinberg, & Cauffman, 2011). In light
of recent characterizations of decision making as a dynamic process
drawing on many cognitions simultaneously (Quartz, 2009), these
modest effects suggest that risk probability judgments may inﬂuence
behavior mainly through joint inter-dependencies with other cogni-
tions. That is, risk probability may pattern together in speciﬁc ways
with cognitions such as risk identiﬁcation, risk tolerance, risk salience,
and risk preference to drive adolescent choices.
The second cognition involves risk identiﬁcation. Tasks in which ad-
olescents spontaneously identify risks (risk identiﬁcation) may capture
developmental age group differences in risk cognitions not identiﬁable
though probability judgments (Beyth-Marom et al., 1993; Millstein &
Halpern-Felsher, 2002). For example, participants have generated
their own lists of potential decision-risks in a small number of develop-
mental studies (Widdice, Cornell, Liang, & Halpern-Felsher, 2006).
These studies indicate that adolescents could spontaneously identify
some risks, but developmental differences did emerge. For instance, ad-
olescents (12–18) spontaneously reported fewer negative conse-
quences of risky decisions (e. g. attending a beer party) than their
parents on roughly half of all behaviors that they have engaged in
only one-time (Beyth-Marom et al., 1993). Further, in a comprehensive
exploration of developmental decision competencies, young adults
(college students) considered more risks and long-term consequences
associated with their hypothetical decisions than adolescents (grades
6–12) (Halpern-Felsher & Cauffman, 2001). Together these ﬁndings
suggest that adolescents have a diminished capacity for identifying
risks relative to young adults. However, rather than directly inﬂuencing
adolescents' problem behavior involvement, diminished risk identiﬁca-
tionmay contribute to speciﬁc patterns of cognitions, and these distinct
patterns may convey either high or low risks to adolescents. As a result,
it is not only important to examine age group differences, but also to as-
sess how risk identiﬁcation patterns together with other cognitions to
shape adolescents' behavioral choices. For instance, adolescents who
identify few risks may also report especially high risk preference. To-
gether, problematic cognition constellationsmay characterize those ad-
olescents who are most heavily disposed toward risky and antisocial
choices.
Third, possible adverse outcomes deter adolescents less than young
adults (i.e., they have greater risk tolerance), especially when pursuing
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tivities (Modecki, 2009). As a result, several scholars have attributed ad-
olescents' problem behavior to their reduced penchant for avoiding
harm (e. g. Spear, 2013). For example, evidence gleaned from the neuro-
imaging literature suggests that a natural inclination to respond to aver-
sive stimuli and avoid harm may be suppressed among adolescents
(Ernst & Fudge, 2009; Ernst et al., 2005; Spear, 2011). Illustratively,
studies using variations of the IOWA Gambling Task found that adoles-
cents (10–18) have a heightened tolerance for loss relative to adults
(18–30) (Cauffman et al., 2010). Several studies have also found a link
between adolescents' decreased sensitivity and externalizing and
other problem behaviors (Ernst et al., 2005; Goudriaan, Grekin, &
Sher, 2007; Hooper, Luciana, Wahlstrom, Conklin, & Yarger, 2008). To-
gether, these ﬁndings suggest that adolescents may have an elevated
threshold for negative outcomes. Further, as with other cognitions de-
scribed here, risk tolerance may not impact behavior directly, but in-
stead may be patterned together with other cognitions to either
discourage or promote adolescents' problematic choices.
Fourth, adolescents may not only differ from young adults in
assessing and responding to risk, they also may differ in the degree to
which they care about risk (risk salience) (Sturman & Moghaddam,
2011). For instance, adolescents attribute less signiﬁcance to aversive
cues than adults within classical conditioning paradigms, and arguably,
negative consequences may be less salient to problematic choices dur-
ing this developmental period (see Spear, 2011). Public health scholars
have likewise attributed adolescents' problem behavior to their dimin-
ished risk salience (Fischhoff et al., 2000; Swisher &Warner, 2013). Ac-
cordingly, adolescents may literally “care less” about potential negative
consequences of problem behavior. Also important to understanding
the impact of risk salience on adolescent behavior is the possibility
that risk salience jointly patterns with other cognitions to create an
overall impression conveying either high or low risk. For instance,
some adolescents may be distinguished by a cognition pattern that
deems potential adverse outcomes inconsequential and this cognition
pattern could help to explain their heavy problem behavior involve-
ment (Fischhoff et al., 2000; Haynie, Soller, & Williams, 2014; Tymula
et al., 2012).
Finally, adolescents' preference for risk (risk preference) may also
embolden their problematic choices (e. g. Shulman & Cauffman, 2013;
Romer, 2010). Experimentation with problem behavior is a hallmark
of adolescence and adolescents rapidly accumulate a series of reinforce-
ments, both positive and negative, for their choices. According to social
development models, these positive and negative reinforcements work
to cultivate adolescents' personal risk calculus or preference. Thus, risk
preference may be especially inﬂuential in catalyzing adolescents'
risky and antisocial choices (Catalano, Kosterman, Hawkins,
Newcomb, & Abbott, 1996).Moreover, risk preference is also implicated
in certain dual-systems interpretations of decisionmaking. Namely, ad-
olescent behavior may be mediated by a personal decision algorithm
that weighs possible rewards relative to potential risks (Shulman &
Cauffman, 2013). Different patterns of development in their brain sys-
temsmay lead adolescents to assign less value to potential risks than re-
wards. Accordingly, adolescents may have an especially strong afﬁnity
for risk relative to young adults. Importantly, the link between adoles-
cents' risk preference and problem behavior may not be direct, but in-
stead, risk preference may interact multiplicatively with other
cognitions to shape adolescents' choices. Thus, for some adolescents,
strong risk preferencemay patternwith other risk cognitions to encour-
age their problem behavior.
The signiﬁcance of patterned cognitions
As highlighted above, recent research argues for “intuitive” concep-
tions of decisionmaking. These models have described decisionmaking
as a relatively automatic process in which individuals weigh an overall
impression of risk against a general impression of potential rewards(Quartz, 2009; Shulman & Cauffman, 2014). Such decisions are efﬁcient
and occur quickly but are also computationally complex because they
draw on a number of pieces of information simultaneously (Quartz,
2009). Here, the underlying representation of risk (or reward), rather
than a single risk cognition, plays a crucial role (Quartz, 2009). Inter-
related control cognitions may thus affect adolescents' antisocial
choices through an overall impression of risk (Albert & Steinberg,
2011; Boyer, 2006; Fischhoff, 2008). If this is the case, the way in
which cognitions pattern together to shape adolescents' choices is as
important as the direct inﬂuence of cognitions on behavior. Person-
centered approaches such as latent proﬁle analysis (LPA) can identify
these patterns or constellations of cognitions within different groups
of individuals (e. g adolescents versus young adults) (Bauer &
Shanahan, 2007). For instance, seemingly comparable groups of adoles-
cents may appear indistinguishable in their risk cognitions at a mean
level, but may manifest very different cognition patterns. LPA captures
these potential differences in patterns and characterizes the dynamic
cognitive process that interweaves contextual and psychosocial inputs
to affect adolescents' choices (Michels, Kropp, Eyre, & Halpern‐Felsher,
2005; Slovic & Peters, 2006).
Because research has not persuasively established predicted associ-
ations between adolescents' risk cognitions and behavior, this points
to a need for a comprehensive approach for considering how cognitions
affect behavior. Studies that combine traditional variable-centered
methods, such as regression, with person-centered analyses, such as
LPA, can offer such an approach. Variable-centered approaches assess
which risk cognitions inﬂuence problem behavior most strongly and
whether relations differ by developmental age group (adolescents ver-
sus young adults); whereas person-centered approaches capture het-
erogeneity in patterns of cognitions among different age groups. These
distinct cognition patterns may differentiate between adolescents who
display more (or less) problem behavior. As a result, research that
uses both approaches, such as the current study, can provide amore ex-
pansive picture of how risk cognitions inﬂuence adolescent choices.Current study
Because developmental research has rarely examined more than
one or two risk cognitions within a single study, we know relatively lit-
tle about whether adolescents and young adults differ in judging risks.
Likewise, research might better characterize how risk cognitions inﬂu-
ence problem behavior. Speciﬁcally, the degree to which cognitions in-
ﬂuence behavior, and whether these relations differ for adolescents
versus young adults remains poorly understood. Finally, research has
yet to examinehow cognitionspattern together among adolescents ver-
sus young adults andwhether such cognition patterns inﬂuence behav-
ior. The current study addresses these gaps. First, I compare adolescents
and young adults on ﬁve key risk cognitions (risk probability, risk identi-
ﬁcation, risk tolerance, risk salience, and risk preference). Second, I exam-
ine the inﬂuence of cognitions on behavior for adolescents versus young
adults. In variable-centered analyses, I test whether associations be-
tween individual risk cognitions and behavior differ as a function of
age-group using moderated multiple regression analyses. In person-
centered analyses, I derive adolescent and young adult decision making
patterns from their risk cognitions. I test the validity of these proﬁles by
examining whether individuals characterized by certain cognition pat-
terns are differentially problembehavior involved. Importantly, all anal-
yses control for a number of potential confounds. For instance, prior
research reports positive correlations between perceived rewards and
problem behavior involvement (see Albert & Steinberg, 2011) and neg-
ative correlations between prior decision experience and perceived risk
(Benthin, Slovic, & Severson, 1993; Halpern-Felsher et al., 2001). Like-
wise, some studies have found that female sex and greater verbal ability
are associatedwith greater perceived risk (Fried & Reppucci, 2001). I ac-
count for these and other potential confounds that could account for age
1 The study included a standardizedRisk Perception Scale (RPS; Siegel et al., 1994) in or-
der to assess the validity of risk cognitions. The RPS asks participants to rate the perceived
risk of eighteen different problembehaviors, for example, “smokingmarijuana,” and “hav-
ing sex without a condom” on a nine-point Likert scale from 0 “Not at all risky” to 8 “Ex-
tremely risky;” Cronbach's α = .91.
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olescents' problematic choices.
Hypothesis
H1. Relative to young adults, adolescents will discern decreased risk as
measured by all ﬁve cognitions (lower risk identiﬁcation, risk probabil-
ity, and salience and higher risk tolerance and preference).
H2. Regression analyses will reveal few unique contributions of risk
cognitions on problem behavior. Age group will moderate the relations
between risk cognitions and problem behavior; relations will be stron-
ger for adolescents versus young adults.
H3. In person-centered analyses, meaningful proﬁles will be derived in
both adolescent and young adult samples, and proﬁle membership will
differentiate individuals who are more heavily involved in problem be-
havior. Given that no study to date has explored risk cognition proﬁles,
this study has no a priori hypotheses about numbers of proﬁles the anal-
yses will reveal. Further, reﬂecting developmental differences, adoles-
cents and young adults will not necessarily be characterized by the
same number of proﬁles.
Methods
Participants
Adolescents and young adult attending schools in a northeastern US
state participated in the current study. The adolescent sample was
drawn from a large public high school in an industrial/suburban area
with a state-average household income. The young adult sample
consisted of undergraduates attending the largest public university in
the state. In linewith previous developmental decisionmaking research
(Beyth-Marom et al., 1993; Gardner & Steinberg, 2005; Millstein &
Halpern-Felsher, 2002), I contrasted these samples to better explain de-
velopmental age group differences. Developmentally, individuals in
these two age groups should differ not only in terms of maturation,
but also in their norms, roles, and social contexts (Modecki, 2008).
Therefore, grouping according to these distinct age-related stages
makes theoretical sense. I implemented two controls for the fact that
samples may differ on characteristics apart from age that could impact
ﬁndings. First, to control for academic functioning, whichmay be higher
in college students, I dropped high school students with average grades
lower than a C average from the sample (n = 15). The sample retains
young adult individuals with lower high school grades to provide a
more conservative test for demonstrating that cognition differences
are developmental and not a selection effect due to higher academic
functioning among young adults. I also re-ran analyses to exclude ado-
lescents whose parents never attended college to control for SES factors.
All results were substantively similar to those reported here.
The adolescent sample (ages 12–18) consisted of 225 (Mage =
15.61; SD = 1.37) students enrolled in a public high school. The school
was selected from an industrial/suburban area with an average house-
hold income equal to the state-average. The adolescent sample was
50.9% female, and 77% of adolescents were Caucasian, a lack of racial di-
versity that reﬂects the demographics of the New England state in
which students reside. Nearly one-third of adolescents (31.4%) reported
their parents had a high-school level of education or less, with the re-
mainder attending at least some college and 21.7%with a 4-year under-
graduate degree or more.
The young adult sample (ages 18–23) consisted of 275 (M age =
18.42; SD = .88) undergraduates at a state university. The young
adult samplewas 57.7% female and 95.3% Caucasian.Most young adults'
parents (90.2%) had some college and almost one-quarter (23.6%) re-
ported their parents had earned a 4-year undergraduate degree or
more.Procedure
Appropriate IRB approval was obtained through the University,
which allowed for informed assent from adolescents and passive con-
sent from their parents. All students gave informed assent and no par-
ents objected to the study. Students were told that their participation
and responses would not affect their academic status, and were given
a debrieﬁng form upon completion of the survey. Young adults received
class credit.
Measures
Table 1 presents bivariate correlations between key studymeasures.
Risk cognitions
Risk cognitionswere based on participant responses across three de-
cision scenarios adapted from Ford, Wentzel, Wood, Stevens, and
Siesfeld, (1990) and O'Conner, Archer, and Wu (1992). These scenarios
depict cheating on a competency exam for school or work, shoplifting,
and an aggressive encounter in a movie theater. An example vignette
is: “You're out shoppingwith someof your close friends and they decide
to take some clothing without paying for it. You don't think it's a good
idea, but they say you should take something too.” Following each vi-
gnette, participants answered a series of questions to tap risk cognitions
related to the depicted problem behavior. Items relevant to each risk
cognition were averaged across the three scenarios. Table 2 describes
cognition means and standard deviations for adolescents and young
adults.
Risk identiﬁcation
Following each vignette, participants were asked to list all possible
risks they might consider, for example: “When you are deciding what
to do, what are the reasons that would make you decide NOT TO take
the clothing? Please list as many as you think of.” Example responses
included “Embarrassing if I get caught;” “Could set the alarm off;”
and “Lose my parents trust.” Participants were also asked to generate
all of the reasons that would make them decide TO take the clothing
(the covariate section discusses Perceived Rewards) and the order of
presentation for risk identiﬁcation and perceived rewards was
counterbalanced across vignettes. Identiﬁcation measures were based
on Halpern-Felsher and Cauffman (2001) and previous research
(Modecki, 2009) shows this measure is related to criminal behavior
and psychosocial variables such as sensation seeking and future
orientation.
Research teams consensus coded responses after establishing agree-
ment with the principal investigator on n = 60 surveys. An additional
10% of surveys were cross-coded for inter-group reliability; %
agreement = 94; Kappa = 92.97. Participants received a score of
(1) for each listed risk. Risks were summed within each vignette and a
higher score indicates greater risk identiﬁcation. Risk identiﬁcation
was signiﬁcantly correlated with a standardized risk perception scale1
(r = .321, p b . 001).
Risk probability
Items adapted from Fried and Reppucci (2001) were used to tap the
perceived probability of negative consequences if the participant chose
to engage in problem behavior. The measure included three ﬁve-point
Likert scale items measuring perceived chances of getting caught
by an authority ﬁgure, being found guilty of breaking a rule/law,
and experiencing punitive consequences (e.g. school suspension or
Table 1
Bivariate correlation coefﬁcients for risk cognitions and problem behavior.
Risk identiﬁcation Risk probability Risk tolerance Risk salience Risk preference Problem behavior
Risk identiﬁcation 1 .25⁎⁎⁎ − .12 .44⁎⁎⁎ − .56⁎⁎⁎ − .16⁎
Risk probability .16⁎⁎ 1 − .16⁎ .42⁎⁎⁎ − .27⁎⁎⁎ − .25⁎⁎⁎
Risk tolerance − .18⁎⁎ − .12 1 − .11 .14⁎ .16⁎
Risk salience .19⁎⁎ .44⁎⁎⁎ − .31⁎⁎⁎ 1 − .44⁎⁎⁎ − .43⁎⁎⁎
Risk preference − .44⁎⁎⁎ − .24⁎⁎⁎ .37⁎⁎⁎ − .29⁎⁎⁎ 1 .39⁎⁎⁎
Problem behavior − .14⁎ − .23⁎⁎⁎ .22⁎⁎⁎ − .25⁎⁎⁎ .33⁎⁎⁎ 1
Note. Adolescent bivariate correlations are above the midpoint; young adult bivariate correlations are below the midpoint.
Problem behavior is square root transformed.
⁎ p b .05.
⁎⁎ p b .01.
⁎⁎⁎ p b .001.
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unlikely” to 5 “Very likely” so that higher scores indicate higher per-
ceived risk probability; Cronbach'sα = .73. Results found a positive as-
sociation between risk probability and standardized risk perception
(r = .34, p b .001).
Risk tolerance
One item tapped risk tolerance for each of the three vignettes. This
item was derived from prior research by Guerra and Slaby (1989) and
read, for example: “How likely would it have to be that you'd get caught
for you to decide NOT to (steal the clothes)?” Participants received a
ruler-scale ranging from 0% to 100% and the instruction to mark an X
along the provided scale. A high score indicates a high risk threshold;
Cronbach's α of .72. Because of the large amount of variance on this
measure relative to other scales in the latent proﬁle analysis, this
itemwas transformed by multiplying by .3 to reduce variance. Risk tol-
erance was negatively associated with standardized risk perception
(r = − .13, p = .004).
Risk salience
One item from each vignette tapped risk salience, modiﬁed from
Guerra (1989). Participants were asked to indicate how much they
would care if they were caught engaging in the antisocial activity, on a
four point scale from (1) “Not at all” to (4) “Very much,”with a higher
score indicating greater risk salience; Cronbach'sα = .72. Risk Salience
was positively correlated with standardized risk perception (r = .50,
p b .001).
Risk preference
One item from each vignette tapped risk preference and was based
on Fried and Reppucci (2001), in which the total number of perceived
rewards (discussed below: % agreement = 93%, Kappa = .90) within
each scenario was divided by the total number of perceived risksTable 2
Adjusted and unadjusted age group means for risk cognitions.
Risk cognition Age group Mean (SD) Adjusted mean1(SE)
Risk identiﬁcation Adolescent 2.20(1.01)c 2.32(.06)a
Young Adult 2.76(.86)d 2.64 (.06)b
Risk probability Adolescent 2.97(.69)c 2.94(.04)a
Young Adult 2.92(.57)d 2.97(.04)a
Risk tolerance Adolescent 1.34(.76)c 1.33(.06)a
Young Adult 1.14(.76)d 1.12(.06)b
Risk salience Adolescent 3.17(.74)c 3.22(.04)a
Young Adult 3.55(.52)d 3.51(.04)b
Risk preference Adolescent 1.15(.92)c 1.11(.04)a
Young Adult .88(.39)d .89(.04)b
Note.Mean (SD).
Adjusted means with different letters differ at the p b .01 level
1 Mean for randomly selected sub-sample of n = 202 adolescents and n = 202 young
adults, adjusted for sex, ethnicity, SES, grade average for last year of high school, verbal
ability, decision experience, and perceived rewards.
c n = 207
d n = 271(% agreement = 94%, Kappa = 92.97). A higher score indicates a great-
er risk preference. Fried and Reppucci report that this is a valid indicator
of risk preference and in their study, it correlated positively with a stan-
dardized risk preference scale (Benthin et al., 1993). In the current
study, risk preference was signiﬁcantly correlated (r = -. 38, p b .001)
with standardized risk perception.
Covariates
All analyses controlled for the dichotomous variables of sex, ethnic-
ity (Caucasian = 0, ethnic minority = 1), SES, grade average for most
recent year of high school, verbal ability, decision experience, and per-
ceived rewards. Sex and ethnicity were treated as dichotomous vari-
ables and the remaining covariates were treated as continuous.
Previous research (Albert & Steinberg, 2011; Benthin et al., 1993; Fried
& Reppucci, 2001; Halpern-Felsher et al., 2001; Millstein &
Halpern-Felsher, 2002; Song et al., 2009) or theoretical assumptions
support the use of these control variables. With the goal of equating
age-groups on likelihood of attending post-secondary education, SES
and high school grades were also included as covariates.
SES was measured based on parents' mean education level, from
(0) Less then high school to (7) graduate/professional degree. Partici-
pants also reported their grade average for their most recent year of
high school. For adolescents this refers to their last full year of school
and for young adults this refers to their senior year of high school.
Response options ranged from (1) All As to (9) All Fs. Analyses do not
include adolescents with less than a C- average. Average grade for ado-
lescents was M = 2.53, SD = 1.15 and for young adults was M = 2,
SD = .65 where (2) = All As and Bs and (3) = all Bs.
Verbal ability
To control for differences in verbal ability, all participants completed
the verbal subscale of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children
(Wechsler, 1991). For both adolescents and young adults, the measure
was read aloud to an entire class of participants, who were asked to
write their best deﬁnition for each word. Responses were scored by
the principal researcher. MA = 40. 25, SDA = 7. 06; MYA = 45.02,
SDYA = 4.07. Verbal ability was strongly correlatedwith average grades
(r = − .45, p b .001) and level of education (r = .45, p b .001).
Decision experience
An item developed by Weinstein (1987) assessed experience mak-
ing decisions from each vignette, asking, “About how much experience
do you have with this type of decision?” Participants could endorse as
many items as applied from a ﬁve-item scale that ranged in level of ex-
perience. Thus, items included, for example, (1) “I don't know anyone
this has happened to” (3) “Close friends or family have had to make
this kind of decision” and (5) “Has happened to me more than once.”
An average of the three highest responses, that is, the three responses
that reﬂected the greatest level of exposure to each decision, was
taken for each vignette. As a result, a higher score on this scale indicates
more decision experience; Cronbach's α = .91. MA = 3.40, SDA =
13K.L. Modecki / Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology 42 (2016) 8–201.04;MYA = 3.36, SDYA = .86. Decision experiencewas positively relat-
ed to self-report problem behavior (r = .38, p b .001).
Perceived rewards
Perceived rewardswere also assessed in relation to each decision vi-
gnette (e. g. Halpern-Felsher & Cauffman, 2001). Within each scenario,
participants were asked “When you are deciding what to do, what are
the reasons that would make you decide TO take the clothing? Please
list as many as you think of.” Example responses included “Will make
me more accepted;” “fun;” and “I get to look good.” Participants re-
ceived a score of (1) for each listed reward. Rewards were summed
within each vignette, so a higher score indicates greater perceived re-
wards. Percent agreement = .93% Kappa = .90. MA = 2.01, SDA =
.93;MYA = 2.27, SDYA = .90. Perceived rewards was negatively corre-
lated with standardized risk perception (r = − .13, p = .004).
Decision making outcome
Problem behavior
Elliott and Ageton (1985) self-report delinquency scale was used to
measure problem behavior. This scale asks, for example, “How many
times in the last year have you (Taken a vehicle for a ride (drive) with-
out permission).” The scale consists of 45 items andmeasures risky, de-
linquent, and aggressive behavior and substance use. Five status
behaviorswere dropped from the analysis because theywould be illegal
for adolescents but not for young adults (e. g skipping school); therefore
the total score reﬂectswhether an individual engaged in 40problembe-
haviors. A high score indicates participation in a wide range of problem
behaviors; Cronbach's α = .92.MA = 6.46, SDA = 6.60; MYA = 4. 75,
SDYA = 4.28. Adolescents engaged in signiﬁcantly more problem be-
havior than young adults (t(350.58) = −3.13, p = .001). Themeasure
was non-normally distributed, with skewness of 1. 98 (SE = .11). Thus,
problem behavior was either treated as a count variable (using a nega-
tive binomial distribution in regression) or else was square root trans-
formed, resulting in a skewness of .13 (SE = .11) (as an auxiliary
variable in LPA).
Analytic strategy
To identify developmental age group differences in theoretically rel-
evant risk cognitions, I ran a multivariate analysis of co-variance
(MANCOVA). The MANCOVA tested for age group and sex differences
between adolescents and young adults on the ﬁve risk cognitions (risk
probability, risk identiﬁcation, risk tolerance, risk salience, and risk pref-
erence) controlling for important covariates that could also explain age
group differences on perceived risk. Next, two complementary analyses
assessed how cognitions inﬂuence behavior. First, I ran a moderated re-
gression to test whether the relations between risk cognitions and be-
havior signiﬁcantly differed according to age group. Second, to identify
risk cognition patterns within both age groups, I ran latent proﬁle
analyses (LPA). LPA is a person-centered statistical technique that as-
signs individuals to one mutually exclusive latent proﬁle based on a
number of observed continuous and categorical variables of interest
(McCutcheon, 1987). These proﬁles are then characterized based
on common response patterns within and between the proﬁles.
Conducting the LPA analyses separately for adolescents and young
adults allowed me to test whether cognitions pattern together to form
meaningful constellations among these different age groups. Cognition
proﬁles were then tested to determine whether, for instance, adoles-
cents who belonged to different proﬁles were differentially involved
in problem behavior. Although age group differences in cognition pro-
ﬁles was of theoretical interest, it was not feasible to run multi-group
models to directly test differences between proﬁles because the adoles-
cent and young adult sampleswere not characterized by the samenum-
ber of proﬁles (Muthén, 2014).
The MANCOVA was run in SPSS v. 22 and the moderated regression
and LPA were run in Mplus version 7 with full information maximumlikelihood estimation (FIML) (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). Within the
LPA's, the probability of an individual belonging to a speciﬁc proﬁle
and their categorization in that proﬁle was calculated as a function of
the scores on all ﬁve risk cognitions. Estimates of associations between
indicators and the latent proﬁleswere represented asmeans (e. g., aver-
age value for risk salience for adolescents in a speciﬁc proﬁle). Based on
the assumption that proﬁles would differ in their variability, models
were speciﬁedwith indicator variances free to vary across latent proﬁles
but with covariances constrained to zero. To determine whether the
characteristics of the proﬁles were signiﬁcantly different across indica-
tors, the equality of means for each indicator was compared across la-
tent proﬁles using the Wald's model test. In validation analyses,
covariates were accounted for by including them in the model com-
mand and regressing them on the proﬁles. Doing so did not signiﬁcantly
impact shape ormembership of the proﬁles. In validation analyses, pro-
ﬁle differences for outcomes not included in themodel (problembehav-
ior)were tested using the AUXILIARY optionwith the e-setting inMplus
(Muthén & Muthén, 2012). This approach uses pseudo class draws to
form Wald chi-square tests for mean comparisons (Clark & Muthén,
2009). In the pseudo class method, multiple random draws are made
from each person's posterior probability distribution to determine
their proﬁle membership. Having a number of random samples allows
individuals to switch into adjacent proﬁles and gives a feel for the vari-
ability related to the distribution (Clark & Muthén, 2009). Mean tests
are then computed based on these draws. Using class membership as
an observed variable results in incorrect standard errors because the
analyses fail to take uncertainty of classiﬁcation into account (Clark &
Muthén, 2009). As a result, the pseudo-class draws method represents
an improvement over assigning individuals to a latent proﬁle based on
their highest posterior probability of being in a given class.
Results
Aim 1: developmental differences in decision making
First, I assessed age group and sex differences on the ﬁve risk cogni-
tions through aMANCOVA using age group (adolescent or young adult)
and sex (male or female) as the independent variables, the ﬁve risk cog-
nitions (risk probability, risk identiﬁcation, risk tolerance, risk salience,
and risk preference) as the dependent variables, and sex, ethnicity,
SES, grade average, verbal ability, and perceived beneﬁts, and decision
experience as the covariates. Box's M test of Equality of Covariances
Matrices had a signiﬁcant result, so, following Tabachnick and Fidell
(2007), I equalized sample sizes for these analyses by random sampling
of cases (n = 101) for each cell (age group by sex)within SPSS. Results
showed sufﬁcient homogeneity of regression for the analysis. Follow-up
ANCOVAs were assessed for signiﬁcance based on a Bonferroni correc-
tion (α = .05/5 = .01).
Risk cognitions were signiﬁcantly related to age group and the
strength of this association was moderate (multivariate F(5, 390) =
6.32, Pillai's Trace = .08, p b .001, η2 = .08). Signiﬁcant univariate dif-
ferences were found with small effect sizes for risk identiﬁcation
(F(1,394) = 12.28, p = .001, η2 = .03), risk tolerance (F(1, 394) =
6.98, p = .009, η2 = .02), risk salience (F(1, 394) = 20.79, p b .001,
η2 = .05), and risk preference (F(1, 394) = 11.81, p = .001, η2 =
.03), but not for risk probability (F(1, 394) = .19, p = .67, η2 =
.001). As Table 2 reﬂects, differences in risk perceptions were in the ex-
pected direction and adolescents reported lower risks than young adults
on each of these cognitions.
Risk cognitions were also signiﬁcantly related to sex (multivariate
F(5, 390) = 6.85, Pillai's Trace = .08, p b .001, η2 = .08). Signiﬁcant
univariate differences were found with small effect sizes for risk identi-
ﬁcation (F(1,394) = 16.51, p b .001, η2 = .04), risk salience (F(1,
394) = 17.64, p b .001, η2 = .04), and risk preference (F(1, 394) =
10.07, p = .002, η2 = .03), but not for risk tolerance (F(1, 394) =
1.91, p = .168, η2 = .01) or risk probability (F(1, 394) = 1.49, p =
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risks as less salient, and reported greater risk preference relative to fe-
male participants. However, risk cognitionswere not signiﬁcantly relat-
ed to the interaction between age group and sex (multivariate F(5,
390) = 1.48, Pillai's Trace = .02, p = .195,1, η2 = .02).
Aim 2: the impact of cognitions on behavior
Variable-centered analyses
In variable-centered analyses, I ran a series of moderated regression
analyses to assess whether the relations between risk cognitions and
problem behavior differed for adolescents versus young adults. These
analyses included the covariates (sex, ethnicity, SES, average grades,
verbal ability, age, perceived beneﬁts, and decision experience) all ﬁve
risk cognitions, and an interaction term comprised of each risk
cognition × age group.2 I ran analyses in Mplus with problem behavior
modeled as a count variable with a negative-binomial distribution.
Table 3 describes the results of the regression analyses. In the overall
model, risk identiﬁcation (b = − .15; SE = .06) risk tolerance (b =
.12; SE = .05) and risk salience (b = − .26; SE = .07)were signiﬁcant-
ly associated with problem behavior, beyond the effects of the covari-
ates. As Table 2 also shows, the link between age group and problem
behavior was signiﬁcantly moderated by risk salience (b = − .32;
SE = .14). Probing the interaction showed that risk salience signiﬁcant-
ly predicted problem behavior for adolescents (b = − .49; SE = .12,
p b .001) but not young adults (b = − .07; SE = .13, p = .59). The in-
teraction was plotted with square-root transformed problem behavior
as the dependent variable usingModGraph (Jose, 2013). Fig. 1 describes
the form of the interaction. Greater risk salience was associated with di-
minished problem behavior involvement for adolescents, but there was
no relation between risk salience and problem behavior for young
adults.
Person-centered analyses
In complementary person-centered analyses, I ran two LPA's (for ad-
olescents and for young adults) to derive latent decisionmaking proﬁles
from the ﬁve risk cognitions. To ensure that proﬁles were meaningful,
stable, and not over-extracted, the decision was made a priori to ex-
clude solutions with proﬁle sizes comprised of less than 5% of the total
sample, which is consistent with prior research (see Roesch, Villodas,
& Villodas, 2010 for a discussion of proﬁle size and over-extraction).
For instance, as class proportions approach zero, small proﬁle sizes can
be a sign of class collapsing and over-extraction (Masyn, 2013). The
LMR LRT (Lo, Mendell, & Rubin, 2001) and the bootstrapped likelihood
test (McLachlan, 1987) were also used to compare a given estimated
model versus a model that had one fewer class. For these tests, a small
p-value supports retention of a more complex model. I also consulted
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978), with lower
BIC indicating improved ﬁt. Finally, I considered model parsimony, in-
terpretability, and proﬁle size in determining the ﬁnal model.
Adolescents
For adolescents, as the top of Table 4 shows, the three-proﬁle
solution emerged as the best ﬁt for the data. The LMR LRT and the
bootstrapped likelihood test indicated a signiﬁcant improvement in
model ﬁt for the three-class versus two-class solution, as signiﬁed by a
small p-value. However, the tests were non-signiﬁcant for the four-
class versus three-class solution, indicating the three-class solution
should be retained. The BIC also pointed to the three-proﬁle solution
as the preferred model, given the lower BIC value. The top of Fig. 2
shows the three-proﬁle solution. The proﬁles consist of 71, 126 and
30 individuals, with good model entropy (entropy = .81; Clark &
Muthén, 2009).2 Analyseswere also runwith age as themoderating variable and controlling for level of
education. Results were similar to those reported here.The top of Table 5 describes the three adolescent cognition
proﬁles: High Probability/High Salience (29% of the sample), Moderate
Identiﬁcation/Moderate Salience (57% of the sample), and Low
Identiﬁcation /High Preference (14% of the sample). Adolescents in the
High Probability/High Salience proﬁle (very likely sanctions for problem
behavior and caring a great deal about possible sanctions) were charac-
terized by signiﬁcantly greater risk identiﬁcation, risk probability,
risk salience, and risk preference than those in either the Moderate
Identiﬁcation/Moderate Salience proﬁle or the Low Identiﬁcation/High
Preference proﬁle. Adolescents in theModerate Identiﬁcation/Moderate
Salience proﬁle (spontaneously detect moderate amount of risks and
care moderately about possible sanctions) were characterized by great-
er risk identiﬁcation and salience, and lower risk preference than those
in the Low Identiﬁcation/High Preference proﬁle, but both groups were
similarly lower in risk identiﬁcation than the High Probability/High Sa-
lience proﬁle. Finally, signiﬁcantly lower risk cognitions relative to the
other two proﬁles across the board, with the exception of risk tolerance,
differentiated adolescents in the Low Identiﬁcation/High Preference
proﬁle (spontaneously identify few or no risks and beneﬁts greatly
outweigh risks). A signiﬁcantly greater risk preference relative to
youth in the other two proﬁles also typiﬁed adolescents in this Low
Identiﬁcation/High Preference proﬁle. Multivariate Wald's tests
examined individual differences between the three proﬁles, and indi-
cated that there were signiﬁcant differences in grade average, Wald's
X2(2) = 10.08. 33, p = .006, such that Low Identiﬁcation/High
Preference adolescents had poorer grades on average (Mave grade =
3.17; SE = .22) thanModerate Identiﬁcation/Moderate Salience adoles-
cents (Mave grade = 2.51; SE = .10) or High Probability/High Salience
(Mave grade = 2.33; SE = .15). However, there were no differences
across proﬁles based on verbal ability, ethnicity, sex, or SES.
Analyses examined whether adolescents' cognition proﬁles were
associated with differences in problem behavior (square root trans-
formed), after accounting for demographic factors, decision experience
and perceived rewards. Adolescent proﬁles differed on problem
behavior involvement, Wald's X2(2) = 18.74, p b .001. Post–hoc tests
revealed that High Probability/High Salience adolescents engaged
in less problem behavior (Mpb = 1.46, SE = .19) than Moderate
Identiﬁcation/Moderate Salience adolescents (Mpb = 2.13, SE = .12) or
Low Identiﬁcation/High Preference adolescents (Mpb = 3.09, SE = .28).
Moderate Identiﬁcation/Moderate Salience adolescents also reported
less problem behavior than Low Identiﬁcation/High Preference
adolescents.
Young adults
For young adults, a two-proﬁle solution best ﬁt the data, as the bot-
tom of Table 4 shows. The LMR LRT and the bootstrapped likelihood test
indicated a statistically signiﬁcant improvement in model ﬁt for the
two-class versus the one-class solution. However, the tests were non-
signiﬁcant for the two-class versus three-class solution. Moreover, al-
though the BIC continued to decrease in the three-class solution, the
three-class solution resulted in a model with a class comprised of less
than 4% of the total sample, indicating a likely over-extraction of classes
(Masyn, 2013). The bottomof Fig. 2 shows the preferred two-proﬁle so-
lution, and the proﬁles consist of 138 and 137 individuals. Model entro-
py was acceptable (entropy = .74; Clark & Muthén, 2009).
The bottom of Table 5 describes the two proﬁles that characterized
young adults, High Identiﬁcation/High Salience (50% of the sample) and
Moderate Identiﬁcation/Moderate Salience (50% of the sample). Young
adults in the High Identiﬁcation//High Salience proﬁle (spontaneously
detect many risks and care a great deal about possible sanctions) were
characterized by signiﬁcantly greater perceived risk on all indices rela-
tive to young adults in the Moderate Identiﬁcation/Moderate Salience
proﬁle. That is, relative to those in theModerate Identiﬁcation/Moderate
Salience proﬁle (spontaneously detect moderate amount of risks and
care moderately about possible sanctions), High Identiﬁcation//High Sa-
lience young adults reported signiﬁcantly higher risk identiﬁcation,
Table 3
Summary of moderated regression analyses for risk cognitions predicting problem behavior for adolescents versus young adults.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable B SE B Β B B B B B
Age group .04 .08 .44 .41 .43 .34 .44 .48
Sex .36 .08 4.66⁎⁎⁎ 4.60⁎⁎⁎ 4.66⁎⁎⁎ 4.66⁎⁎⁎ 5.01⁎⁎⁎ 4.76⁎⁎⁎
Ethnicity .05 .13 .36 .34 .35 .41 .38 .54
Ses .05 .03 2.18⁎ 2.18⁎ 2.19⁎ 2.22⁎ 2.38⁎ 2.22⁎
Average grade .16 .05 3.21⁎⁎ 3.19⁎⁎ 3.22⁎⁎ 3.21⁎⁎ 2.97⁎⁎ 3.16⁎⁎
Verbal ability − .01 .01 − .98 −1.07 − .99 −1.0 −1.07 − .97
Beneﬁts .31 .06 5.03⁎⁎⁎ 4.66⁎⁎⁎ 5.01⁎⁎⁎ 4.93⁎⁎⁎ 5.42⁎⁎⁎ 5.05⁎⁎⁎
Decision experience .31 .05 6.37⁎⁎⁎ 6.30⁎⁎⁎ 6.39⁎⁎⁎ 6.28⁎⁎⁎ 6.45⁎⁎⁎ 6.38⁎⁎⁎
Risk identiﬁcation − .15 .06 −2.43⁎ −2.26⁎ −2.43⁎ −2.43⁎ −2.65⁎⁎ −2.81⁎⁎
Risk probability − .09 .07 −1.26 −1.26 −1.23 −1.23 −1.28 −1.24
Risk tolerance .12 .05 2.43⁎ 2.33⁎ 2.44⁎ 2.40⁎ 2.81⁎⁎ 2.62⁎⁎
Risk salience − .26 .07 −3.70⁎⁎⁎ −3.81⁎⁎⁎ −3.70 −3.74⁎⁎⁎ −2.82⁎⁎ −3.58⁎⁎⁎
Risk preference − .12 .07 −1.65 −1.14 −1.65 −1.68 −2.21⁎ −2.39⁎
Risk identiﬁcation × age group 1.19
Risk probability × age group − .23
Risk tolerance × age group .70
Risk salience × age group −2.39⁎
Risk preference × age group 1.63
BIC 2547.42 2552.45 2553.54 2553.15 2547.89 2551.70
Note. Age group: 0= young adult, 1= adolescent; sex= 0= female, 1=male. Ethnicity: Caucasian= 0, other ethnicity= 1; SES is a proxy based on own and partner's or both parents'
education level. Average grade is scored such that higher grades are equated with lower numbers. Problem behavior is modeled based on a negative-binomial distribution.
⁎ p b .05.
⁎⁎ p b .01.
⁎⁎⁎ p b .001.
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and risk preference. Multivariate Wald's tests indicated signiﬁcant dif-
ferences in sex across proﬁles Wald's X2(1) = 8.64, p = .003, such
that High Identiﬁcation/High Salience young adults were more likely to
be female (Msex = 1.67, SE = 0.04) than young adults in theModerate
Identiﬁcation/Moderate Salience proﬁle (Msex = 1.48. SE = .05). Proﬁles
did not differ according to verbal ability, ethnicity, SES, or grade average.
Validation analyses for the young adult proﬁles indicated differences on
problem behavior (square root transformed); (Wald's X2(2) = 24.45,
p b .001). High Identiﬁcation/High Salience young adults reported less
problem behavior (Mpb = 1.56, SE = .09) than Moderate Identiﬁca-
tion/Moderate Salience young adults (Mpb = 2.24, SE = .09).Fig. 1. Risk salience × age group interacDiscussion
Social scientists agree that adolescents' reduced cognitive control ca-
pacities are implicated in their heavy problem behavior involvement
(Romer, 2010). Despite the intuitive appeal of this explanation, previous
research has found inconsistent evidence that adolescents underesti-
mate risks relative to (young) adults. As a result, researchers, practi-
tioners, and parents may still wonder whether risk estimation affects
teenagers' antisocial choices. The results of this study arguably suggest
that yes, risks domatter for adolescents' problem behavior involvement
and theymatter in a couple of important ways. First, adolescents gener-
ally under-appreciate risks. Second, risk cognitions are inter-dependenttion predicting problem behavior.
Fig. 2. Adolescent and young adult cognition proﬁles.
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involvement, regardless of age. In this study, adolescents discerned de-
creased risk relative to young adults asmeasured by four out of ﬁve the-
oretically relevant risk cognitions. In fact risk probability judgments,
which have been themainstay of previous research, was the only cogni-
tion on which adolescents and young adults did not differ. Moreover,Table 4
Model ﬁt comparisons classes 1 to 4.
BIC VLMR p LMR p
Adolescents
Class 1 2802.94
Class 2 2507.05 b .001 b .001
Class 3 2411.22 .0001 .0001
Class 4 2418.56 .10 .11⁎
Young Adults
Class 1 2535.00
Class 2 2319.55 .0003 .0003
Class 3 2308.90 .05 .052⁎
Note. BIC = Bayes Information Criteria; VLMR = Vuong–Lo–Mendell–Rubin likelihood
ratio test; LMR= Lo–Mendell–Rubin likelihood ratio test.
p-values correspondwith tests comparing the estimatedmodel (number of proﬁles on the
same line) versus a model that has one less class (number of proﬁles on the line above). A
small p-value supports retention of the more complex model.
⁎ Solution resulted in an over-extracted proﬁle with less than 5% of participants.risk probability did not independently inﬂuence problem behavior, net
of other cognitions and covariates. Importantly, cognitions also pat-
terned together in different ways among adolescents versus young
adults. Speciﬁcally, in this study a unique maladaptive cognition proﬁle
characterized adolescents but not young adults, Low Identiﬁcation/High
Preference. Adolescents who belonged to this maladaptive proﬁle were
particularly poor at identifying risks and were also the most heavily
problem behavior involved. Thus, risk cognitions do matter. However,
future studies need to broaden the scope of cognitions that are mea-
sured and consider that cognitions may work as a summation of their
inter-related inﬂuences, rather than through independent effects.
Previouswork has explored developmental differences in risk cogni-
tions mainly through the use of probability judgments (Slovic, 1998;
Slovic et al., 2004). Based on risk probability judgments, many studies
have concluded there are few age differences in perceived risks. Howev-
er, the literature has largely overlooked other important cognitions on
which adolescents and young adults might differ. This investigation ex-
amined developmental differences in a total of ﬁve risk cognitions iden-
tiﬁed within the research literature as potentially important to
adolescent decisionmaking, risk probability, risk identiﬁcation, risk tol-
erance, risk salience, and risk preference. Findings indicated that adoles-
cents differed from young adults on four of these ﬁve cognitions, albeit
with small effect sizes. Speciﬁcally, adolescents identiﬁed fewer risks,
had a higher tolerance for negative consequences, cared less about
Table 5
Characteristics of proﬁles.
Adolescent indicators High probability/high salience (28.93%) Moderate identiﬁcation/moderate salience (57.30%) Low identiﬁcation/high preference (13.77%)
Risk identiﬁcation a2.87(1.10) b2.10(.71) c.79(.45)
Risk probability a3.47(.67) b2.80(.58) b2.59(.52)
Risk tolerance a1.10(.89) a1.39(.64) a1.58(.82)
Risk salience a.3.89(.16) b2.99(.59) c2.27(.80)
Risk preference a.75(.31) b.96(.35) c2.82(1.59)
Young adult indicators High identiﬁcation/high salience (49.81%) Moderate identiﬁcation/moderate salience (50.19%)
Risk identiﬁcation a3.05(.90) b2.46(.71)
Risk probability a3.15(.54) b2.68(.51)
Risk tolerance a.80(.69) b1.45(.69)
Risk salience a3.90(.16) b3.21(.52)
Risk preference a.71(.27) b1.04(.42)
Note. Manifest indicators that do not share a superscript (i.e., within row) are signiﬁcantly different at p b .001.
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than young adults. Adolescents could gauge theprobability or likelihood
of risks that the researcher provided just as well as young adults. These
ﬁndings suggest that adolescents under-appreciate risk and risk-related
consequences, and their attenuated risk perspectivemay help to explain
adolescents' afﬁnity for problem behavior.
To better understand the role of cognitions in problem behavior, this
study took two complementary approaches. First, variable centered-
analyses assessed whether risk cognitions exert an independent effect
on behavior, net of other cognitions and covariates such as perceived
beneﬁts and decision experience. Of the ﬁve cognitions, risk identiﬁca-
tion, risk tolerance, and risk preference predicted problem behavior
for the entire sample. Again, risk probability, the cognition most prior
research has assessed, did not exert a signiﬁcant independent effect.
Further,moderated regression results indicated that the effect of risk sa-
lience on problem behavior signiﬁcantly differed by age group. More
speciﬁcally, lower risk salience predicted greater problem behavior in-
volvement among adolescents but not young adults, suggesting that di-
minished risk salience may play a previously overlooked role in
adolescents' risky and antisocial choices. This is important because if ad-
olescents simply do not care about possible risks, interventions
targeting risk perceptions in order to reduce antisocial behavior will
likely fail. Indeed, scholars have argued that prevention programs
need to consider the possibility of results such as these, which point to
the prospect that different risk cognitions may impel different groups
of individuals toward problem behavior involvement (Donohew et al.,
2000).
Scholars have also argued that different individualsmay drawondif-
ferent cognitive heuristicswhen deciding to engage in problembehavior
(Donohew et al., 2000). To test this notion, a complementary, person-
centered approach to analyseswas taken. These person-centered analy-
ses tested whether discrete constellations of risk cognitions character-
ized distinct groups of individuals, highlighting the possibility of
complex and non-linear associations between cognitions (Beadnell
et al., 2005). Indeed, recent characterizations of decision making make
it clear that individuals draw on numerous cognitions simultaneously,
which combine to generate an overall impression of risk (e. g.
Shulman & Cauffman, 2014; Slovic et al., 2004). By identifying particular
constellations of cognitions among individuals, rather than focusing on
single variables, this study identiﬁed substantive cognition patterns.
Speciﬁcally, among adolescents, the analysis identiﬁed three proﬁles
(High Probability/High Salience; Moderate Identiﬁcation/Moderate Sa-
lience; and Low Identiﬁcation/High Preference). Among young adults,
only two proﬁles were identiﬁed (High Identiﬁcation/High Salience;
Moderate Identiﬁcation/Moderate Salience). These young adult proﬁles
closely resembled adolescents' two most protective risk cognition pat-
terns in shape. Thus a particularly maladaptive cognition proﬁle, Low
Identiﬁcation/High Preference (spontaneously identiﬁed few or no risks
and beneﬁts greatly outweighed risks), only characterized adolescents.This maladaptive cognition proﬁle was especially notable because ado-
lescents belonging to this proﬁle were also themost heavily involved in
problem behavior.
Not only were adolescents in this Low Identiﬁcation/High Preference
proﬁle most involved in problem behavior, but youth in this proﬁle
demonstrated a distinct pattern of cognitions—in both level and
shape—relative to the other proﬁles. Illustratively, Low Identiﬁcation/
High Preference adolescents self-identiﬁed very few risks of problem be-
havior involvement and reported that potential negative consequences
were not especially salient to them. Low Identiﬁcation/High Preference
adolescents also reported a very strong risk preference. Thus, a typical
adolescent belonging to this proﬁle was indifferent to potential risks
and simultaneously held very favorable views of problem behavior in-
volvement. Recent research has pointed to favorable risk valuations as
a key driver of adolescent delinquency (Shulman & Cauffman, 2013).
Using a person-centered approach, this study demonstrates that this
preference for risk also patterns with an indifference to potential costs
Moreover, adolescents in this problematic decision proﬁle, Low Iden-
tiﬁcation/High Preference, were not uniformly deﬁcient on all aspects of
perceived risk. In fact, risk tolerance did not differentiate Low Identiﬁca-
tion/High Preference adolescents from those adolescents with average
(Moderate Identiﬁcation/Moderate Salience) or highly protective (High
Probability/High Salience) proﬁles. Although experimental work points
to adolescent deﬁciencies with respect to risk tolerance—adolescents
appear to have a high threshold for risk (e.g. Cauffman et al.,
2010)—this cognition was not particularly inﬂuential in characterizing
subgroups of adolescents. One possible explanation for this null ﬁnding
is that adolescents are homogenous in demonstrating relatively high
risk tolerance, perhaps due to immaturity in the harm avoidance sys-
tem, including the amygdala (Ernst et al., 2005). As a result of these ceil-
ing effects, in which all adolescents demonstrated high risk tolerance,
the analysis could not characterize distinct groups of adolescents
based on their patterning of this cognition. Further, Low Identiﬁcation/
High Preference adolescents endorsed similar levels of risk probability
asModerate Identiﬁcation/Moderate Salience adolescents.Many previous
studies have examined risk probability as a central tenet of perceived
risk (e.g. Halpern-Felsher et al., 2001). Given that risk probability did
not distinguish the most problematic decision makers, however, re-
searchers should not use this cognition as a litmus test for perceived
risk among adolescents. More generally, the study's ﬁndings conﬁrm
that adolescents who are heavily engaged in problem behavior can be
deﬁcient on some risk cognitions, but not others. These ﬁndings thus
agree with a body of variable-centered research that has provided
mixed evidence of deﬁciencies in perceived risks among adolescents
who engage in problem behavior.
In contrast to adolescent decision proﬁles, whichwere not uniformly
high or low across all indices of perceived risk, the two young adult pro-
ﬁles were more consistent. High Identiﬁcation/High Salience young
adults were characterized by signiﬁcantly higher risk identiﬁcation,
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erance than Moderate Identiﬁcation/Moderate Salience young adults. In
other words, among young adults in this sample, all ﬁve cognitions con-
tributed tomeaningful cognition patterns and young adults were either
high or moderate on each, across the board. For instance, moderate risk
tolerance clustered with other cognitions to denote moderate risk, in
general. Further, young adults who belonged to this moderate risk pro-
ﬁle reported the highest involvement in problem behavior. Thus, these
ﬁndings demonstrate that young adults rarely display low perceived
risk, even those young adults who engage in relatively high levels of
problem behavior. Moreover, given that the cognitions that comprise
young adult proﬁles point to uniformly high (or moderate) risk, this
may indicate that young adults havemore coherent and better integrat-
ed cognitive control networks than adolescents (Crone & Dahl, 2012;
Luciana, 2013; Luna, Padmanabhan, & O'Hearn, 2010).
Notably, adolescents and young adults could not be characterized by
similar cognition proﬁles across the board. Instead, only two of the three
cognition proﬁles found among adolescents were identiﬁed among
young adults. Although ﬂeshing out etiological processes would require
longitudinal research, these cross-sectional results offer a speculative
hypothesis that future studies might address. During adolescence, a
problematic cognition proﬁle that translates to an attenuated risk heu-
ristic characterizes individuals who are at greatest risk for problem be-
havior involvement (e. g. Fischhoff, 2008). During the transition to
young adulthood, individuals age out of this aberrant risk heuristic to-
ward one of two decision patterns, both of which are more protective
against problem behaviors.
It is also possible that themost problematic decisionmakers, charac-
terized among adolescents by the Low Identiﬁcation/High Preferencepro-
ﬁle, were simply not represented within the study's young adult
sample, which was comprised of university students. For instance,
higher academic ability or higher SES in the young adult sample argu-
ably could have accounted for the lack of a third, more problematic cog-
nition proﬁle among young adults. That being said, several analysis
checks were run to limit the possibility—eliminating adolescents who
reported less than average grades from the study and re-running analy-
ses to exclude those without at least some parental tertiary
education—but doing so did not entirely eliminate this possibility. Be-
cause mixture models are sample-dependent, future research should
replicate ﬁndings in other samples in order to ensure generalizability.
It is possible that different numbers or types of proﬁles could emerge
within other samples of young adults, particularly among young adults
who engage in substantial amounts of problem behavior and/or are not
on a developmental pathway that includes higher education. Addition-
ally, unpacking the potential developmental change alluded to in these
cross-sectional ﬁndings requires longitudinal research. In particular, re-
search should assesswhether andwhy adolescents transition intomore
protective cognition proﬁles as they move into young adulthood.
Assessing latent proﬁles of risk cognitions, in addition to testing re-
gression models, provides better understanding of how risk cognitions
inﬂuence adolescents' problem behavior. Speciﬁcally, regression results
highlighted that risk probability may not drive risky and antisocial be-
havior. Moreover, results showed a unique association between risk sa-
lience and problem behavior for adolescents but not young adults.
Latent proﬁle analyses identiﬁed groups of adolescents (but not young
adults) who were highly problem behavior involved, and indeed were
very low on risk salience. Yet very low risk identiﬁcation and very
high risk preference also characterized these adolescents. Taken togeth-
er these ﬁndings indicate that as a universal prevention strategy, in-
creasing the salience of negative consequences for adolescents may be
especially useful. Importantly, however, adolescents are not a homoge-
nous group. Thus, for more targeted programs, such as diversion pro-
grams for adolescents who are already participating in antisocial
behavior, strategies directed at all three aberrant cognitions in the Low
Identiﬁcation/High Preference proﬁle, risk salience, risk identiﬁcation,
and risk preference, may be especially useful. Several scholars haveoutlined comprehensive approaches for targeting a broad swath of cog-
nitions during adolescence (e. g. Fischhoff, 2008; Bruine de Bruin,
Downs, & Fischhoff, 2007). Programs that take a multi-pronged ap-
proach toward altering inter-connected risk cognitions may mediate
change in adolescents' problem behavior more effectively than other
programs. Given known challenges in exacting behavior change
among individuals who are most at-risk, such a multi-faceted approach
seems warranted.
This study is comprehensive in that it measures many theoretical
relevant risk cognitions and in subsequently making developmental
comparisons between adolescents and young adults. It is also novel in
that it tests complementary person-centered models, in addition to
variable-centered models. However, the results of this study must also
be considered within the context of its limitations. First, as described
above, study data were cross-sectional and cohort differences may
have existed between adolescents and young adults. To better under-
stand developmental change in decisionmaking, future research should
follow adolescents across time, as they transition into young adulthood.
Second, participantswere almost entirely Caucasian and future research
would beneﬁt from inclusion of more diverse samples of adolescents
and young adults. Third, to assess risk cognitions, this study used
open-ended vignettes describing cheating, stealing, and aggression. In
this study, adolescents and young adults did not signiﬁcantly differ in
their reported experienceswith these types of decisions. However,ﬁnd-
ings could differ if vignettes described different types of behaviors such
as risky sex or drug use. Because young adults may have greater oppor-
tunity to engage in these types of behaviors, it is possible that a third,
problematic proﬁle comprised of young adults most heavily involved
in serious risk behaviors could emerge in this case. Moreover, although
use of vignettes to assess risk cognitions represents an improvement
over standardized measures that may not represent young peoples' ac-
tual experiences (Halpern-Felsher & Cauffman, 2001), future research
would beneﬁt from continued innovation of methods. For example,
the ﬁeld could beneﬁt from decision making measures that can both
mimic the dynamic experience of risky and antisocial decision making
and can coherently disentangle risk cognitions.
In light of these limitations, the current study makes several new
contributions to the literature. First, adolescents do report diminished
perceptions of risk relative to young adults, on four out of ﬁve cogni-
tions. The only cognition on which adolescents and young adults did
not differ was risk probability, a measure often used to assess adoles-
cents' risk perception. Second, risk probability did not independently in-
ﬂuence problem behavior. Importantly, too, risk salience predicted
problem behavior for adolescents, but not adults. Thus, caring little
about potential negative consequences, whatever they may be, could
play a previously-overlooked role in adolescents' heavy problembehav-
ior involvement. Third, risk cognitions patterned together in different
ways among different age groups. Adolescents were characterized by
three meaningful cognition proﬁles, and young adults were character-
ized by two. Notably, only adolescents were uniquely characterized by
a third, maladaptive cognition proﬁle. This proﬁle was distinguished
by a constellation of cognitions that were not problematic across all in-
dices, but nonetheless designated a heuristic representing low per-
ceived risk. All told, these ﬁndings offer provocative preliminary
evidence of developmental differences between adolescents and
young adults on risk cognitions implicated in their problem behavior.
Moreover, results point to key manifest cognitions that appear to
drive a particularly worrisome cognitive pattern among adolescents.
Practitioners might target these cognitions among at-risk youth to mit-
igate their problem behavior involvement.
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